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THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN
ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE
IN THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA
ROBERT V. PERCIVAL† & ZHAO HUIYU††
In 1972 leaders of most of the nations of the world gathered in
Stockholm for an historic first global summit on the environment, the
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment.1 By a vote of 1120, representatives of the nations assembled at that conference adopted a
declaration emphasizing the importance of protecting the planet’s
environment and outlining foundational principles of environmental law.2
Now, more than four decades later, nearly all countries have adopted
substantial environmental laws.3 But despite considerable progress,
pollution problems still pose fundamental threats to public health in some
parts of the world.
China sent a large delegation to the 1972 Stockholm Conference,
which helped prompt the development of Chinese domestic environmental
law and policy.4 Today China has an impressive body of national
environmental laws, but they often are poorly implemented and enforced.5
Copyright © 2014 Robert V. Percival & Zhao Huiyu.
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†† KoGuan Law School of Shanghai Jiao Tong University
1. See GÜNTHER HANDL, DECLARATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE
HUMAN ENVIRONMENT (STOCKHOLM DECLARATION), 1972 AND THE RIO DECLARATION ON
ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, 1992 1 (2012), available at http://legal.un.org/
avl/pdf/ha/dunche/dunche_e.pdf.
2. Id. at 2.
3. See Dr. Rajendra Ramlogan, The Environment and International Law: Rethinking the
Traditional Approach, 3 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 4 (2001) (showing that, after 1970, there were 305
multilateral environmental agreements, while between 1800 and 1970, there were only 182); About,
ECOLEX.ORG,
http://www.ecolex.org/ecolex/ledge/view/About_en_US;DIDPFDSIjsessionid=
AD572EC08D01F18C0BEC45BE5BED28D5 (last visited Nov. 16, 2013) (“Environmental law has,
over the past thirty years, . . . [seen] a significant growth in multilateral and bilateral agreements,
national legislation, international ‘soft law’ documents, and law and policy literature, as well as related
jurisprudence and court decisions.”).
4. CHARLES R. MCELWEE, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN CHINA: MITIGATING RISK AND ENSURING
COMPLIANCE 22–23 (2011).
5. See RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW 525 (2002)
(“[A]lthough there are environmental laws on the books, they frequently go unenforced, in part because
of lack of political will to enforce them if that means slowing down economic growth.”); Arwen Joyce
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Coupled with rapid industrial development, poor enforcement has resulted
in massive environmental problems.6 As a public, enraged by deteriorating
environmental conditions, demands action from the country’s new leaders,
many believe that China should embrace the U.S. model of environmental
law.7 A prominent feature of the U.S. model is its emphasis on encouraging
civil society to participate in the development, implementation, and
enforcement of environmental policy.8 Politically powerful regulated
industries and environmental NGOs wage fierce lobbying campaigns in
Congress and before the agencies.9 Agencies must solicit and consider
public input before issuing regulations.10 Everyone affected by agency
actions has the right to seek judicial review of those actions and ordinary
citizens and NGOs may file lawsuits to enforce U.S. environmental laws.11
& Tracye Winfrey, Taming the Red Dragon: A Realistic Assessment of the ABA's Legal Reform Efforts
in China, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 887, 891–92 (2004) (discussing enforcement challenges faced by
environmental regulators in China).
6. For example, in January 2013, air pollution in Beijing reached levels described online by
locals as “postapocalyptic,” “terrifying,” and “beyond belief” and by the U.S. Embassy’s @BeijingAir
Twitter feed as “Beyond Index.” Edward Wong, On Scale of 0 to 500, Beijing’s Air Quality Tops
‘Crazy Bad’ at 755, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2013, at A16. Epidemiologists working with the World Health
Organization estimate that air pollution in China causes 1.2 million premature deaths annually. Edward
Wong, Early Deaths Linked to China’s Air Pollution Totaled 1.2 Million in 2010, Data Shows, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 2, 2013, at A9. The Chinese Academy of Environmental Planning estimated in 2010 that
environmental damage robbed the Chinese economy of approximately $230 billion, or 3.5% of the
country’s gross domestic product. Edward Wong, Cost of Environmental Damage in China Growing
Rapidly Amid Industrialization, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2013, at A4.
7. C.f. Joyce & Winfrey, supra note 5, at 891–92 (Because China’s original model of leaving
environmental enforcement up to local governments led to unpredictable enforcement efforts, critics are
urging China to increase the public’s ability to participate and for the central government to regulate on
the regional scale).
8. A plaintiff suing under environmental citizen lawsuit provisions has been referred to as a
“private attorney general.” Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 737–38 (1972). Most major
environmental laws in the United States have citizen suit provisions. See, e.g., Toxic Substances
Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (2006); Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2006);
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1270 (2006); Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1365 (2006); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2006); Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (2006); Emergency Planning and
Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a)(1) (2006); Noise Control Act of 1972,
42 U.S.C. § 4911 (2006); Resources Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (2006); Safe
Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j- 8 (2006). Some environmental statutes do not contain citizen
suit provisions, notably the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. §
136 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
9. See PAUL J. QUIRK, INDUSTRY INFLUENCE IN FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES 4 (1981).
10. See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (requiring for all rulemaking
conducted by federal agencies, that “[a]fter notice required by this section, the agency shall give
interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written data,
views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation”).
11. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–06 (generally permitting judicial review of all final actions taken by federal
agencies). See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Leavitt, 355 F. Supp. 2d 544, 545–46 (D.D.C. 2005) (recounting a
history of suits against EPA to compel them to comply with statutory deadlines in the Clean Air Act).
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Could the key to China controlling its environmental problems be to
empower Chinese civil society along the lines of the U.S. model? Although
air and water pollution have become so severe that the Chinese public is
demanding more effective government action to combat them, China has a
very different legal and political culture than the United States. This article
questions the notion that transplanting the U.S. model of civil society’s role
necessarily would make Chinese environmental law yield dramatically
improved results.
INTRODUCTION
This article compares the roles of civil society in the various stages of
U.S. and Chinese environmental governance. Part II compares the
historical evolution of environmental NGOs in the U.S. and China. Part III
examines the process of adopting environmental legislation in the two
countries. Part IV discusses the influence of civil society on the process of
issuing regulations to implement the environmental laws in the U.S. and
China. Part V examines judicial review of environmental regulations. Part
VI discusses the role of civil society in the enforcement of environmental
regulations in the U.S. and China.
The strategies employed by NGOs to promote environmental
protection have broadened in recent years to include transparency
initiatives that encourage companies to voluntarily improve their
environmental practices. Part VII of the paper discusses such initiatives in
the U.S. and China. Part VIII of the paper concludes by discussing what the
U.S. can learn from China and what China can learn from the U.S. with
respect to improving environmental governance through empowerment of
civil society. It cautions that one should not assume that aspects of one’s
legal system can be transplanted effectively to the other. China’s
experience illustrates that avoiding a “race to the bottom” is an important
reason for maintaining powerful environment agencies at the federal level.
While China has the luxury of being able to enact tough environmental
laws with little effective opposition from the regulated community, the lack
of hard-fought legislative battles that produce compromises with industry
also may be a contributing factor to China’s greater problem of enforcing
its environmental laws.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL NGOS
Although environmental NGOs have a longer history in the United
States than in China, there has been a recent surge in the growth of
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environmental NGOs in China.12 This section compares their evolution in
the U.S. with China’s recent experience.
A.

Environmental NGOs in the United States
The rise of the modern environmental movement in the U.S. is often
traced to 1962 when Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring was published.13 Silent
Spring alerted the public to the possibility that pesticides could be
accumulating in the food chain in a way that could cause severe, long-term
environmental damage.14 In 1967, the Environmental Defense Fund was
formed by a group of scientists who sought to have DDT banned because it
was precisely that kind of pesticide.15 Another group, the Natural
Resources Defense Council (“NRDC”), was created in an effort to force the
Federal Power Commission to consider environmental concerns when
licensing an electric power project that would have destroyed a particularly
scenic and historic stretch of the Hudson River at Storm King Mountain.16
At the time, no federal agencies shouldered primary responsibility for
responding to concerns about environmental protection. The new
environmental groups went to court to try to require government agencies
to be more responsive to environmental concerns.
To be sure, conservation groups had been in existence in the United
States for more than seven decades when Silent Spring was published. The
Sierra Club, founded in 1892, played a major role in early twentieth
century battles concerning management of public lands.17 But the
environmental groups formed in the 1960s and 70s fundamentally differed
from the older conservation groups in their level of activism.18 They were
12. See TIMOTHY HILDEBRANDT, SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE AUTHORITARIAN STATE IN
CHINA 1–2 (2013) (“In the past decade, social organizations [including environmental ones] have
quickly sprouted in China.”).
13. See, e.g., Sally J. Kelley, An Annotated Bibliography of Selected Environmental Law
Resources of Interest to Practicing Attorneys, 1995 ARK. L. NOTES 111, 111 (1995) (“In 1962 the
publication of Rachel Carson's Silent Spring led to widespread public awareness, concern, and
discussion [and activism, which] served as catalysts to the enactment of significant environmental
protection legislation and to the establishment of the Environmental Protection Agency.”).
14. Id.
15. Our Mission and History, ENVTL. DEF. FUND, http://www.edf.org/about/our-mission-andhistory (last visited Nov. 16, 2013). See generally THOMAS R. DUNLAP, DDT: SCIENTISTS, CITIZENS
AND PUBLIC POLICY (1981) (chronicling the efforts of the Environmental Defense Fund against DDT).
16. See ROBERT GOTTLIEB, FORCING THE SPRING: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN
ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT 136–43 (1993); E-Law: What Started it All?, NATURAL RES. DEF.
COUNCIL (May 5, 2000), http://www.nrdc.org/legislation/helaw.asp.
17. SIERRA CLUB, HISTORY OF ACCOMPLISHMENTS 1, available at http://www.sierraclub
.org/history/downloads/SCtimeline.pdf.
18. See SAMUEL P. HAYES, BEAUTY, HEALTH, AND PERMANENCE: ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS IN
THE UNITED STATES, 1955-1985 13–14 (1989) (discussing how the conservation in the early twentieth
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committed to influencing environmental policy at every stage of legislative
and regulatory processes.19 The membership of these new environmental
NGOs grew dramatically in the next few decades. It is estimated that in
1960 approximately 150,000 people had contributed to environmental
NGOs in the U.S. and that their combined annual budgets totaled less than
$20 million.20 By the end of the 1980s, eight million people in the U.S. had
contributed to 100 national environmental NGOs that had a combined
budget of more than $500 million.21
The growth of U.S. environmental NGOs was fueled in part by
funding from foundations. The Ford Foundation, which expressly sought to
promote the development of public interest law in the early 1970s,
provided important seed money for some of the new environmental
groups.22 Early victories of the modern U.S. environment movement
attracted additional membership contributions and spurred political
entrepreneurs to expand their range of actions.
B.

Environmental NGOs in China
Civil society organizations have had a long and sometimes turbulent
history in China from ancient times to the present.23 Following the
Communist Revolution of 1946 “civil society virtually disappeared as a
bottom-up movement” in China.24 Fearing the development of competitors
to its power, the Communist Party repressed civil society organizations,
which reemerged only slowly after Deng Xiaoping’s reforms.25
In recent years China’s civil society has played an increasingly
important role in environmental protection. First, since the 1990s the
century differed from the much more popular environmental movement that emerged after World War
II and grew over the following decades). See also id. at 53 (discussing rapid growth of the Sierra Club
and National Wildlife Federation during the 1960s); id. at 60 (discussing the formation of groups such
as the Environmental Defense Fund and the Natural Resources Defense Council, during the late 1960s
and the 1970s).
19. See id. at 60–61 (discussing how environmental groups in the 1970s were able to advocate
with “considerable effectiveness in judicial and administrative as well as legislative decision making”).
20. Robert V. Percival, Environmental Legislation and the Problem of Collective Action, 9 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 9, 13 (1998).
21. Id.
22. See FORD FOUNDATION, THE PUBLIC INTEREST LAW FIRM: NEW VOICES FOR NEW
CONSTITUENCIES 5, 20, 23 (1973) (noting that the Foundation donated over $4 million to public interest
firms between 1970 and 1973, including the Environmental Defense Fund, Natural Resources Defense
Council, and Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, now Earthjustice).
23. See generally KARLA W. SIMON, CIVIL SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FROM
ANCIENT TIMES TO THE “NEW REFORM ERA” 369 –71 (2013) (detailing the history of civil society
organizations beginning in the Qin dynasty).
24. Id. at 370.
25. Id.

Percival -Final (Do Not Delete)

7/21/2014 4:28 PM

146

[Vol. XXIV:141

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

number of environmental NGOs in China has increased significantly.26
Second, mass citizen activism, often focusing on “not in my backyard”
(NIMBY) issues, has been on the rise in China.27 Third, the use of legal
processes by individual citizens and lawyers through petitions, lawsuits,
and other forms of activism has increased.28 Civil society is playing an
increasingly important role in efforts to awaken environmental awareness,
strengthen environmental protection legislation, expose illegal business
activity and governmental failures, and to promote environmental dispute
resolution.
China’s first significant environmental NGO was “Friends of Nature”,
a grassroots NGO similar to modern NGOs.29 Environmental NGOs were
pioneers in the Chinese NGO movement, and today they play a vital role in
the growth and development of Chinese NGOs.30 Among the current NGOs
in China, environmental NGOs are believed to be the most active and the
groups with the greatest social impact.
The history of environmental NGOs in China is not a long one, but it
has had many twists and turns. Chinese NGOs, especially those at the
grassroots level, have faced many institutional obstacles in the course of
their development. These include the difficulty of registering as NGOs,
financing difficulties and, other constraints on carrying out their activities.
Many environmental groups that function essentially as NGOs do not meet
the Chinese government’s formal qualifications for registration.31 In this
article we treat these groups as environmental NGOs, even if they are not
formally registered as such by the Chinese government.

26. All China Env’t Fed’n, Summary Report on the Development of China’s Environmental Civil
Society Organizations in 2008 1 (Oct. 30–31, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at
www.acef.com.cn/uploads/soft/131220/down_1.doc.
27. See e.g., Paul Mooney, Citizen Activism, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA (Nov. 30, 2012),
http://www.hrichina.org/en/crf/article/6416; Wanxin Li, Jieyan Liu & Duoduo Li, Getting Their Voices
Heard: Three Cases of Public Participation in Environmental Protection in China, 98 J. ENVTL.
MGMT. 65, 71 (discussing citizen activism and NIMBY attitude in reaction to the Liu Li Tun garbage
incineration project in China).
28. Randall Peerenboom, China's Legal System: A Bum Rap?, UCLA ASIA INST.,
http://www.international.ucla.edu/asia/news/article.asp?parentid=2878 (last visited Nov. 16, 2013)
(“Increasingly, citizens are willing to take on the government through administrative reconsideration
and litigation.”).
29. See Michael M. Gunter, Jr. & Ariane C. Rosen, Two-Level Games of International
Environmental NGOs in China, 3 WM. & MARY POL’Y REV. 270, 273 (2012) (“Beginning with the first
domestic NGO, Friends of Nature in 1994 . . . .”).
30. Guosheng Deng (邓国胜), Research on Development Index of China Environmental NGO, 6
CHINA NON-PROFIT REV. 200, 201 (2010); Chen Jie, The NGO Community in China, 68 CHINA
PERSPECTIVES 29, ¶ 4 (2006).
31. Gunter & Rosen, supra note 29, at 273 (“NGO registration remains one of the most imposing
obstacles for NGOs in China.”).
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1. Characteristics of Chinese Environmental NGOs
a. Development Is Rapid but Legal Recognition Remains Difficult
The number of China’s environmental NGOs is increasing rapidly. A
survey conducted by the All China Environment Federation in 2008 found
that the number of environmental NGOs in China exceeded 3,500, an
approximately 28% increase over the number in 2005.32 These included
more than 1,300 government-supported environmental NGOs, more than
1,380 student groups, more than 500 grass roots organizations, and 90
branches of international environmental NGOs.33 The number of grass
roots NGOs had more than doubled from 2005, increasing by more than
300.34
Chinese law requires environmental NGOs to obtain the identity of a
corporation and their activities must be in accordance with “Regulations for
Registration and Management of Social Organizations”, (issued 1998)” and
“Provisional Regulations for the Registration Administration of People-Run
non-Enterprise Units.35 NGOs accept double-layered management.,
wherein registration is managed by the civil affairs department36 while dayto-day business is managed by the competent business unit.37 The latter has
been given great power to review and monitor the activities of the
environmental NGOs, and to investigate and punish their misdeeds.38 To
avoid those kinds of responsibilities, the competent business unit often
refuses to affiliate with environmental NGOs, which severely restricts the
establishment of environmental NGOs.39 In addition, the above regulations
still establish many substantive restrictions, which have become major
institutional obstacles for the development of environmental NGOs.40
32. All China Env’t Fed’n, supra note 26, at 1.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See Gunter & Rosen, supra note 29, at 278–79 (summarizing major registration laws,
including the Regulations on the Registration and Management of Social Organizations (revised) and
Provisional Regulations on the Registration and Management of Popular Non-enterprise Work Units).
36. Regulations for Registration and Management of Social Organisations, CHINA DEV. BRIEF
(Nov. 11, 1999, 10:14 AM), http://www.chinadevelopmentbrief.com/node/298. Article 6 provides that
“[t]he Ministry of Civil Affairs and local Civil Affairs departments . . . are the peoples government
agencies for registration and management of social organisations. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See Gunter & Rosen, supra note 29, at 280 (“[M]any government organizations are reluctant
to take on the responsibilities and potential liabilities of becoming a sponsor organization.”).
40. See generally id. at 279–80. For example, Article 13 provides a non-exhaustive list of
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China’s environmental NGOs face many difficulties. The first one is
an identity problem; the requirements for official registration are so harsh
that many NGOs are not formally registered as Non-Profit Organizations
(NPOs).41 The rest operate under other identities, registering as industry
and commerce entities, or dependent and unincorporated bodies, or even
operating as illegal organizations. But even unregistered environmental
groups still act essentially as NGOs, so the standard of what defines an
environmental NGO should be based on an organization’s aims concerning
environmental protection, instead of on their apparent registration
identities.
Today Chinese NGOs promote the progress of civil society by playing
important roles in meeting community needs, helping supervise
government actions, and promoting democracy-building. In recent years,
China’s executive and legislative leadership have been trying to promote
legislation to require NGOs to improve their management systems. Former
Chinese Civil Affairs Bureau Director Chen Jin Luo led preparation of the
“experts’ recommended draft on non-profit organization of the PRC.”42
This draft proposes to lower the threshold for registration of NGOs and to
relax substantive access restrictions.43 In addition, the Chinese NGO
experts’ draft also calls for promoting a tax relief system, governmental
procurement of NGO public services, and other reforms.44 These reforms
eventually may help remove some of the current confusion over the identity
of many environmental NGOs.

restrictions, stating that “[t]he registration and management agency will not approve the registration
preparation” if “it can be shown that the objectives and area of work of a social organisation applying
for the first stage of registration do not comply with Article 4 of these regulations,” if “there is already a
social organisation active in the same or similar area of work” in the same administrative area, if “the
persons applying or the intended persons in charge have ever received criminal sanction of being
deprived of their political rights, or do not possess complete civil liability,” or if “deception is employed
in the preliminary application.” CHINA DEV. BRIEF, supra note 36.
41. Koon-Kwai Wong, Greening of the Chinese Mind: Environmentalism with Chinese
Characteristics, 12 ASIA-PACIFIC REV. 39, 53 (2006).
42. Chen Jin Luo (陈金罗), A Review of 30 Year’s NGO Legislation, PHILANTHROPY TIMES (Oct.
26, 2010, 9:45AM), http://gongyi.ifeng.com/news/detail_2010_10/26/2899037_0.shtml.
43. Id. The revised administrative regulations likely to be adopted by the end of 2013 are expected
to assist in the registration of hundreds of thousands of NGOs according to Wang Jianjun, director of
the Bureau of Administration of NGOs under the Ministry of Civil Affairs. New Rules for NGOs on
Cards, CHINA DAILY (Apr. 19, 2013, 8:45 AM), http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/weekly/201304/19/content_16421841.htm.
44. Id.
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b. China’s Environmental NGOs’ Various Backgrounds and Functions
Environmental NGOs in China can be divided into three general
categories: (1) officially endorsed NGOs, (2) international NGOs, and (3)
grassroots NGOs. The NGOs in each of these categories perform different
functions and face different limitations.
One successful example of an officially endorsed environmental NGO
is the All-China Environment Federation (ACEF).45 ACEF is recognized by
China’s Ministry of Environmental Protection.46 Official backing gives this
type of NGO incomparable advantages for registration, operation, and
fundraising.47 The group has very rich resources in official contacts and
background, influential channels for discovering environmental illegal
actions, and direct contact with powerful official media.48 ACEF has
professional expertise in technology and legal services, information
disclosure, and even litigation.49 However, because of the group’s close
relationship with the administrative agencies, it generally cannot freely
criticize nonfeasance by administrative agencies, like many famous foreign
environmental NGOs. This is significant because in China nonfeasance is a
prevalent phenomenon among environmental authorities at all levels.50
International environmental NGOs, like the NRDC and the
Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), both of which have offices in Beijing,
benefit from their access to substantial financial support from foreign
sources.51 According to various sources, people and groups in the United
States and Canada annually contribute to Chinese NGOs up to U.S. $650
million, an amount that has been increasing yearly.52 More importantly,
international NGOs contribute ideas concerning how to advance civil
45. See generally Introduction, ALL CHINA ENV’T FED’N (Aug. 30, 2012),
http://www.acef.com.cn/en/aboutacef/2013/1216/1004.html.
CHINA
ENV’T
FED’N
(Aug.
30,
2012),
46. See
Our
Advantages,
ALL
http://www.acef.com.cn/en/aboutacef/2013/1216/1007.html (highlighting that an advantage of ACEF is
support from the Ministry of Environmental Protection).
47. See ALL CHINA ENV’T FED’N, supra note 45.
48. See Organizational Structure, ALL CHINA ENV’T FED’N (Aug. 30, 2012),
http://www.acef.com.cn/en/aboutacef/2013/1216/1005.html; ALL CHINA ENV’T FED’N, supra note 46.
49. Xiaoxing Feng, Playing the Role of ENGOs, Improving the Level of Public Participation, and
Promoting Sustainable Development, ACEF (July 2, 2012), http://www.acef.com.cn
/news/lhhdt/43973.shtml.
50. MCELWEE, supra note 4, at 6; Qie Jianrong (郄建荣), Governments' Nonfeasance is Major
Source of Environmental Chronic Disease, LEGAL DAILY (Nov. 14, 2011, 7:22 PM),
http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/index_article/content/2011-11/14/content_3091860.htm?node=5955.
51. Cf. Gunter & Rosen, supra note 29, at 286 (listing budgets of six well-known international
NGOs in China, including EDF and NRDC).
52. Environmental NGOs: Further Money Pressure Highlighted, CE NEWS (Oct. 14, 2011),
http://www.cenews.com.cn/xwzx/hjyw/201110/t20111014_706797.html.
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society and they can enlighten China’s NGOs concerning practices that
originated in the West.53 However, international NGOs in China face one
major quandary: because of their international character, they face stricter
supervision and greater restrictions on their activities than they do when
operating outside of China.54
China’s grassroots NGOs face challenges because of their small size
and their difficulties obtaining financing. According to a survey on the
scale of environmental public interest organizations, Chinese grassroots
environmental NGOs generally are small with 73% having less than ten
staff persons, and 41% with less than five staff.55 Chronic funding
shortages face even some well-known grassroots NGOs.56 This can be
traced in part to the lack of tax incentives for contributing to nonprofits
because contributions to charitable organizations are not tax deductible as
they are in the United States.57 Third, there is a need for capacity-building
among grassroots NGOs. The professional level of their staff is much lower
than that of the average international NGO.58 In addition, the distant
relationship between government and grassroots NGOs often results in a
lack of institutionalized channels for participating in governmental
decision-making. However, grassroots NGOs still enjoy public support
because they are perceived to be more objective as neutral third parties
monitoring governmental and corporate behavior.59
2. Reasons for the Relative Success of Environmental NGOs in China
Compared with U.S. NGOs, China’s environmental NGOs are still in a
formative stage and perform more limited functions. But among NGOs in

53. Ta Kung Pao, China’s Overseas NGOs have Reached more than 4000, Facing Legal
Embarrassment (June 29, 2012), http://www.dongnanyanet.com/cms/a/kyn/2012/0710/2515.html.
54. See Gunter & Rosen, supra note 51, at 279; Carl Minzner, New Chinese Regulations on
Foundations, 2 INT’L J. CIV. SOC. L. 110, 113–15 (2004).
55. Guosheng Deng, supra note 30, at 205.
56. See Cai Shouqiu & Wen Lizhao, The Latest Development of Environmental NGOs in China, 4
INT’L UNION FOR CONSERVATION OF NATURE ACAD. ENVTL. L.J. 39, 42 (2013).
57. Tax benefits are only available to legally-registered NGOs, so many grassroots NGOs that are
registered as businesses do not benefit. Shawn Shieh, Can Bill Gates and Warren Buffet Start a
Philanthropic
Revolution
in
China,
NGOs
In
China
(Oct.
1,
2010),
http://ngochina.blogspot.com/2010/10/can-bill-gates-and-warren-buffet-start.html; see also Lian Mo,
Beijing Looks at Laws on Philanthropy, CHINA DAILY (Nov. 3, 2010, 6:05 PM),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-11/03/content_11498980.htm.
58. Guosheng Deng, supra note 30, at 205.
59. See Luna Lin, Government-Backed NGO Under Pressure to Act Against China's Largest Coal
Miner, CHINA DIALOGUE (July 23, 2013), https://www.chinadialogue.net/blog/6227-Governmentbacked-NGO-under-pressure-to-act-against-China-s-largest-coal-miner/en.
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China the functions of environmental NGOs are remarkable and notably
greater than those enjoyed by other kinds of NGOs. There are three main
reasons for this difference.
Theoretically, environmental NGOs create less political sensitivity
than other NGOs in the view of Chinese government officials. NGOs that
focus on human rights, labor, and other issues are viewed as potentially
more threatening by Chinese officials.60 Despite the lack of a “grassroots
culture” for NGOs, it is widely understood that the Chinese government is
more tolerant of the existence and development of environmental NGOs
than NGOs who focus on other issues.
Environmental NGOs enjoy a warmer relationship with executive
authorities than other NGOs in China. In recent years, because of a onesided emphasis on economic development, China’s Ministry of
Environmental Protection (MEP) has faced incredible difficulties in
fulfilling its increasing administrative functions.61 Despite the importance
of MEP’s mission, the agency has faced many barriers to enforcement from
other central authorities and local governments.62 This has increased the
need for China’s environmental protection departments to rely more
heavily on environmental NGOs for support and services. In January 11,
2011, the Ministry of Environmental Protection issued “guidance on
cultivation and guide the orderly development of Chinese environmental
NGOs,” to improve their quality.63 Among the organizations surveyed,
71% of organizations have received the help and support of the
government, and these institutions have great expectations for the role of
government in environmental protection.64
As noted above, international NGOs have made important
contributions that have assisted in the development of Chinese
environmental NGOs.65 These include contributions of funds, human
resources and assistance with capacity-building for China’s NGOs.

60. See Wang Fei, Operation and Development Trend of the NGOs of Environmental Protection
in China, 247 XUE HUI 14 (2009); Chen, supra note 30, at ¶ 6.
61. Guosheng Deng, supra note 30, at 204; MCELWEE, supra note 4, at 83.
62. Id.; see also MCELWEE, supra note 4, at 104 (describing how administrative rules have “coequal status” with local decrees and local rules).
63. See Guidance on Cultivation and Guide the Orderly Development of Environmental Guidance,
MINISTRY OF ENVTL. PROT. (Dec. 10, 2010), http://www.zhb.gov.cn/gkml/hbb/bwj
/201101/t20110128_200347.htm.
64. Guosheng Deng, supra note 30, at 203.
65. See infra notes 51–54and accompanying text.
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3. The Principal Functions of Chinese Environmental NGOs
Chinese environmental NGOs have functioned at a much lower level
than some international NGOs, focusing on tree planting, calling for the
protection of wild animals, and helping the government to raise public
awareness of environmental problems.66 Chinese environmental NGOs
have been less active than international NGOs in promoting environmental
legislation, enforcement, and participating in the process of regulatory
development. Even the MEP’s active promotion of environmental NGOs
would not seem to be enough. Institutional or political reform may be
needed before Chinese NGOs participate in the legislative and judicial
processes that shape environmental policy as closely as NGOs do in the
United States.
A survey of Chinese environmental NGOs found that such
organizations typically focus on projects like the following: exchanging
information, building public awareness, education, sustainable
development demonstration projects, capacity building, and policy research
and other means for promoting environmental protection.67 The number of
environmental organizations that provide legal assistance and that engage
in policy advocacy is very limited with only 11 organizations engaging in
these activities.68 This reflects both the limited operational capacity of
Chinese environmental NGOs, as well as China’s legal and institutional
environment. China’s legal system is imperfect, especially with respect to
environmental public interest litigation. The litigation system is not perfect
and the judiciary is not independent.69 Legal proceedings to protect the
environment and to vindicate private rights cost too much and achieve too
little success.70 In addition, due to the lack of institutionalized participation
in decision-making and ineffective government communication channels,
grassroots NGOs rarely are involved in government decision-making and
development planning that may have a significant impact on the
environment.71

66. Guosheng Deng, supra note 30, at 206.
67. Guosheng Deng, supra note 30, at 206.
68. Id.
69. See e.g., Zhang Chun, Cadmium Pollution in Yunnan Reopens Debate over Public Interest
Litigation,
CHINA DIALOGUE
(July
15,
2013),
https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/s
how/single/en/6206-Cadmium-pollution-in-Yunnan-reopens-debate-over-public-interest-litigation
(commenting on the inability of environmental NGOs to successfully prosecute alleged violators of
environmental statutes due to high appraisal costs and ambiguous statutes).
70. Id.
71. Guosheng Deng, supra note 30, at 206–07.
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III. CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE ENACTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
LEGISLATION
During the 1970s and 1980s, a broad bipartisan consensus in favor of
environmental protection led the U.S. Congress to adopt comprehensive
laws responding to most of the prominent environmental problems of the
time.72 However, there is now a sharp partisan split in Congress that makes
it virtually impossible to enact new environmental legislation, shifting
environmental battles to the agencies and the courts.73 Although the general
public and regulated industries have little input on the legislative process in
China, the National People’s Congress (NPC) regularly reaches out to
prominent academics and gives them the responsibility for drafting new
legislation with substantial input from affected government agencies.
Legislative proposals that win the support of the Chinese Communist Party
routinely are ratified by overwhelming majorities of the NPC when it meets
each March.
A.

United States
In a remarkable burst of legislative activity between 1970 and 1976
the U.S. Congress enacted a series of laws requiring the establishment of
comprehensive regulatory programs to protect the environment. These laws
include the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, the Safe Drinking Water
Act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, and the Toxic
Substances Control Act. These acts establish a comprehensive regulatory
infrastructure that seeks to protect the public from environmental harm.
While various theories have been proposed to explain why Congress was
able to enact these remarkable laws,74 the early legislation was passed even
before the new, national environmental groups had developed a significant
lobbying presence.75 Some observers have even argued that the initial laws
were particularly stringent because of the absence of unified, national
groups representing environmental interests that were capable of making
compromises with business interests in the lobbying process.76
These laws routinely were expanded and strengthened when

72. ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY
92–97 (7th ed. 2013) (chronicling the history of environmental law in the United States during the
1970s).
73. Id. at 100.
74. Many of these theories are reviewed in Percival, supra note 20, at 13–15.
75. E. Donald Elliott, Bruce A. Ackerman & John C. Millian, Toward a Theory of Statutory
Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 313, 338 (1985).
76. Id.
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reauthorized by Congress in the decade that followed. By then both
industry groups and environmental organizations had developed
sophisticated lobbying operations to influence Congress.77 Laws to address
new concerns raised by highly publicized incidents of visible
environmental harm also were enacted. These included the “Superfund”
legislation adopted in 1980 after contamination of homes in Love Canal
from long-buried hazardous wastes, the Emergency Planning and
Community Right to Know Act adopted in response to the Bhopal tragedy,
and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 adopted in response to the Exxon Valdez
oil spill.78
Beginning with the 1994 Republican takeover of Congress, the
bipartisan consensus in favor of more stringent environmental legislation
disappeared. As both industry and public interest groups became more
sophisticated in their efforts to influence legislation it has proven to be
much easier for either set of interests to block legislation than to win
enactment of new statutes. Today the U.S. Congress is sharply split on
issues of environmental regulation.79 The Republican takeover of the U.S.
House of Representatives in the 2010 elections produced the most antienvironmental house of Congress in U.S. history. In the 112th Congress
that met from 2011 through 2012, the Republican-controlled U.S. House of
Representatives approved more than 300 bills to roll back environmental
regulations.80 These measures generally did not become law because they
could not win passage in the U.S. Senate, which is controlled by Democrats
more sympathetic to environmental regulation. Due to the partisan split in
the two houses of Congress it has become virtually impossible for Congress
to enact any new environmental legislation.
B.

Public Participation in Legislative Initiatives in China
Because China has a one-party political system, it has avoided the
legislative gridlock that has stymied the enactment of new environmental
legislation in the United States. Under normal circumstances, almost all the
laws that the Communist Party wants to enact meet little resistance. But
when new legislation or important development projects are being
77. Today these lobbying operations are even more sophisticated. See, e.g., Andrew Kreighbaum,
Oil Spill Bills Stall in Senate as Industry, Environmental Lobbyists Battle, OPEN SECRETS BLOG (Aug.
23, 2010, 4:35 PM), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2010/08/post-2.html.
78. PERCIVAL, supra note 72, at 144, 339, 351–52.
79. Id. at 100.
80. MINORITY STAFF OF THE H. COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 112TH CONG., THE ANTIENVIRONMENT RECORD OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: FINAL SUMMARY OF THE 20112012, available at http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/sites/default/files/documents/AntiEnvironment-Voting-Record-of-112th-Congress-Summary-Final.pdf..
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considered, environmental NGOs can find many avenues for influencing
government decisions.
1. The Relevant Legal Provisions for Initiating Legislation
In accordance with the relevant provisions of the Chinese Constitution
and the “Legislation Law of the PRC,” the National People’s Congress
Standing Committee, the State Council and the Central Military
Commission, the Supreme People’s Court, Supreme People’s
Procuratorate, the National People’s Congress (NPC), and a number of its
representatives have the legal power in China to initiate legislation.81
China’s administrative legislation and rules are only drafted by the State
Council. Those ministries and commissions in the State Council that need
to develop administrative regulations must seek preliminary approval from
the State Council.82 Thus in China because of the strict legal project
procedures, theoretically it is impossible for civil society to have a direct
role in initiating legislative proposals.
2. The Efforts of Chinese Environmental NGOs to Initiate
Environmental Legislation
China’s environmental NGOs still have some influence on efforts to
initiate environmental legislation. They can do so in the following ways.
First, they can appeal for the adoption of necessary environmental
legislation through their own NGO publications,83 by network platform,84
81. XIANFA [CONSTITUTION] art. 64, § 1 (2004) (China). See also Lifa Fa (立法法) [Law on
Legislation] art. 12, 13, 24, 25 (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15,
2000, effective July 1, 2000) 2000 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 112 (China),
translated in LEGISLATION LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT NO.
31, CHINESE GOVERNMENT’S OFFICIAL WEB PORTAL (Mar. 15, 2013), http://english.gov.cn/laws/200508/20/content_29724.htm.
82
See also Lifa Fa (立法法) [Law on Legislation] art. 57 (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 2000, effective July 1, 2000) 2000 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG.
GAZ. 112 (China), translated in LEGISLATION LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, ORDER OF
THE PRESIDENT NO. 31, CHINESE GOVERNMENT’S OFFICIAL WEB PORTAL (Mar. 15, 2013),
http://english.gov.cn/laws/2005-08/20/content_29724.htm.
83. For example, the earliest Chinese environmental NGO “Friends of Nature,” in its annual
environmental green book, China Environmental Development Report, noted that some important
national nature reserves in China are facing a crisis and called for the nature reserve law to be enacted
as soon as possible. Chinese Environmental NGOs are Calling for Legislation to Protect Nature
Reserves, CHINA NEWS NETWORK (Apr. 19, 2012, 7:57 PM), http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2012/0419/3832928.shtml.
84. See e.g. Lou Hua et al., E administration Square, WWW.NEWS.CN (May 9, 2009) (in order to
hear more voices of the masses, people.com.cn in 2009 opened "E square" for Internet users, in order to
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and by the use of influential media. Second, academics working with the
environmental NGOs often are asked to help draft legislative proposals or
specific legislation, which are then are submitted to the NPC through its
members and the CPPCC.85 If these legislative proposals are approved by
the Party leadership, they will be adopted much more easily by the National
People’s Congress than is the case in the U.S. Congress where fierce
lobbying battles between interest groups are waged.
IV. CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE REGULATORY PROCESS
A.

United States
In the U.S. the federal environmental laws and the Administrative
Procedure Act require agencies to solicit public input before adopting
regulations.86 Agencies generally must provide the public with notice and
an opportunity to submit comments prior to adopting any new
regulations.87 Regulatory targets are intensely interested in forestalling the
issuance of regulations and reducing the cost of complying with them.
Thus, during the rulemaking process regulated industries in the U.S.
fiercely lobby not only the agency conducting the rulemaking, but also the
Office of Management and Budget’s Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs (OIRA), which is tasked by the President with reviewing and
approving particularly significant proposed and final regulations.88 While
public interest groups also participate in this process, their influence more
often than not is dwarfed by industry lobbying efforts.89
enable the public, Congress representatives, and government officials to exchange views via the
Internet). Over the past few years "E square" has been the vehicle for the submission of more than
14,000 recommendations. Another example is that many environmental NGOs called for tobacco
control legislation in Beijing in 2008 in their own annual symposium. 400 Environmental
Organizations Calling for Tobacco Control Legislation, BEIJING TIMES (Nov. 1, 2008, 9:51 AM),
http://news.qq.com/a/20081101/000879.htm.
85. Hong Liu, China ENGOs' Participation in Policy Making, 6 FUDAN PUB. ADMIN. REV. 5
(2010) (discussing some examples of how the members of environmental NGOs used their own status
as members of the NPC and the CPPCC to put forward the proposals to NPC & CPPCC).
86. PERCIVAL, supra note 72, at 170–71.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 172–74.
89. See, e.g., John M. Broder, Re-election Strategy Is Tied to a Shift on Smog, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
17, 2011, at A1 (arguing political strategy was behind the White House’s rejection of EPA’s proposed
smog standard); Haley Sweetland Edwards, He Who Makes the Rules, WASH. MONTHLY, Mar./Apr.
2013, at 27, (describing how industry lobbying has neutered agencies trying to issue regulations to
implement the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act). But see Cass R.
Sunstein, Commentary, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126
HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1860–63 (2013) (former OIRA administrator arguing that although OIRA meets
far more frequently with business groups than environmental NGOs its actions vetoing national
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For NGOs one of the most challenging aspects of the regulatory
process is the need to convince agencies to focus regulatory attention on a
particular problem. If environmental legislation requires an agency to
regulate a particular problem, the federal environmental laws generally
authorize private parties to bring citizen suits to compel government
officials to perform duties required by law.90 These provisions were used
by environmental NGOs to force EPA to issue regulations implementing
many of the federal laws that required comprehensive regulatory programs
to protect the environment. As frustration mounted over EPA delays in
issuing regulations, Congress repeatedly amended the environmental laws
to establish statutory deadlines for EPA’s issuance of regulations.91
Because these deadlines are enforceable through citizen suits, they have
given environmental NGOs new tools for forcing regulatory action.
In a few instances environmental NGOs in the U.S. also have been
able to use lawsuits to compel EPA to regulate certain substances or
practices that were not explicitly subject to regulation in the underlying
environmental statutes. For example, a Sierra Club lawsuit forced EPA to
establish a program to prevent significant deterioration of air quality in
areas currently in attainment for the national ambient air quality
standards.92 A lawsuit by the NRDC forced EPA to promulgate a national
ambient air quality standard for lead.93
But usually it is very difficult to convince an already overburdened
agency to focus regulatory attention on a particular issue. This is well
illustrated by the history of NGO efforts to persuade EPA to ban gasoline
lead additives.94 Tetraethyl lead was invented by chemist Thomas Midgely
environmental regulations had nothing to do with politics).
90. RICHARD G. STOLL, EFFECTIVE EPA ADVOCACY: ADVANCING AND PROTECTING YOUR
CLIENT’S INTERESTS IN THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 15 (2010).
91. PERCIVAL, supra note 72, at 98.
92. The Sierra Club successfully argued that the Clean Air Act’s statutory purpose to “protect and
enhance” air quality created an obligation not only to attain the NAAQS, but also to prevent the
deterioration of air quality that was presently better than the NAAQS. After the district court decision
was affirmed in an unpublished per curiam opinion by the D.C. Circuit, it was then sustained when the
Supreme Court split 4-4 on the merits. Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253, 256 (D.D.C.
1972), aff'd per curiam, 4 ERC 1815 (D.C. Cir. 1972), aff'd by an equally divided court mem. sub nom.,
Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541, 541 (1973).
93. The court ruled that because EPA had already made a determination that lead endangered
public health in order to regulate lead additives in fuel, and because it was indisputable that lead
satisfied the criteria pollutant standard of being emitted from “numerous or diverse mobile or stationary
sources,” EPA also had a nondiscretionary duty to declare lead a criteria pollutant and regulate it under
the provisions of the Act governing those pollutants. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Train, 545 F.2d 320,
322 (2d Cir. 1976).
94. The history of NGO efforts to persuade EPA to ban lead additives is reviewed in detail in
Ellen K. Silbergeld & Robert V. Percival, The Organometals: Impact of Accidental Exposure and
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in the 1920s as an inexpensive means for boosting gasoline’s octane
content.95 By the late 1960s Cal Tech scientist Clair Patterson was warning
that increased use of leaded gasoline was generating dangerously high
levels of lead in the ambient air and in soil near major highways.96 As
enacted by Congress in 1970, the Clean Air Act expressly authorized EPA
to regulate fuel additives that the agency found to endanger public health.97
Pressed by environmental NGOs to respond to this problem, EPA adopted
regulations to set an upper limit on the amount of lead additives that
refiners could use in the total pool of gasoline (leaded and unleaded) that
they produced.98
Having made a finding that lead in the ambient air endangered public
health, EPA was sued by NRDC, which successfully argued that the Clean
Air Act also required EPA and NRDC to set a national ambient air quality
standard for lead.99 After EPA’s initial limits on the amount of lead in
gasoline were struck down by a three-judge panel as based on evidence that
was “speculative and inconclusive at best,” the U.S. Court of Appeals, by a
5-4 vote, reversed this decision and upheld EPA’s regulation in a decision
that represents the U.S. judiciary’s strongest endorsement of precautionary
regulation.100
In 1982 the lead in gasoline issue resurfaced when Vice President
Bush, as head of President Reagan’s Vice Presidential Task Force on
Regulatory Relief, forced EPA to propose abolishing the very limits on the
lead content of gasoline that the D.C. Circuit had upheld. NGOs played a
major role in defeating this initiative.101 The NGOs received surprising
support from conservative columnist George Will who wrote a column
entitled “The Poison That Poor Children Breathe,” attacking the
proposal.102 In a decision upholding EPA’s decision to abandon the
Experimental Data on Regulatory Policies, in NEUROTOXICANTS AND NEUROBIOLOGICAL FUNCTION:
EFFECTS OF ORGANOHEAVY METALS 328 (Hugh A. Tilson & Sheldon B. Sparber eds., 1987); and Lisa
Heinzerling, Frank Ackerman & Rachel Massey, Applying Cost-Benefit to Past Decisions: Was
Environmental Protection Ever a Good Idea?, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 155, 160–72 (2005).
95. Jamie Lincoln Kitman, The Secret History of Lead, THE NATION (Mar. 20, 2000),
http://www.thenation.com/article/secret-history-lead?page=0,2.
96. Clair Patterson, Contamination and Natural Environments of Man, 11 ARCH. ENVTL. HEALTH
344 (1965).
97. Heinzerling, Ackerman & Massey, supra note 94, at 164.
98. Silbergeld & Percival, supra note 94, at 342.
99. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Train, 545 F.2d 320, 328 (2d Cir. 1976).
100. See Ethyl Corp. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 541 F.2d 1, 54 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc).
101. Silbergeld & Percival, supra note 94, at 344–45.
102. George Will, The Poison Poor Children Breathe, WASH. POST, Sept.16, 1982, at A23,
reprinted in LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY READER 101 (Percival & Alevizatos
eds., 1997).
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proposal, but giving small refineries more time to comply with it, the U.S.
Court of Appeals stated, “the demonstrated connection between gasoline
lead and blood lead,” and “the demonstrated health effects of blood lead
levels . . . would justify EPA in banning lead from gasoline entirely.”103
With the D.C. Circuit having confirmed that a ban on lead in gasoline
would not encounter legal problems, NGOs then thought strategically
concerning how to persuade EPA to act. At the time the agency was facing
deep political problems because cars that were supposed to run on leaded
gasoline often were being misfueled with the slightly cheaper leaded
gasoline, destroying their catalytic converters and contributing to an
unexpected rise in air pollution.104 EPA responded to this problem by
requiring states to undertake politically unpopular vehicle inspection
programs. At the same time the Reagan administration’s newly empowered
Office of Management and Budget was pushing all regulatory agencies to
base their decisions on cost-benefit analyses.105 One environmental NGO
pushed EPA to solve the misfueling problem by phasing out gasoline lead
additives, arguing that a cost-benefit analysis would demonstrate enormous
net benefits from such action.106 EPA ultimately proposed to phase out
leaded gasoline toward the end of the Reagan administration, despite the
President’s ideological opposition to environmental regulation. When
implemented, this single regulatory action caused massive reductions in
children’s exposure to lead. It now has been adopted by nearly every
country in the world.107
This history demonstrates the power of NGOs thinking strategically
and seeking alliances even with groups that normally are not proponents of
environmental protection measures. Lead phasedown is now widely viewed
as EPA’s most notable environmental achievement.108 Yet then-EPA
Deputy Administrator Al Alm noted that it was an initiative that came
about almost by accident “through a ‘chance’ encounter” with someone
who suggested that EPA do a cost-benefit analysis of a lead phaseout.109

103. Small Refiners Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 705 F.2d 506, 531
(D.C. Cir. 1983).
104. Silbergeld & Percival, supra note 94, at 346.
105. Id. at 345.
106. Id. at 345–46.
107. See Phasing Out Leaded Gasoline, WORSTPOLLUTED.ORG, http://www.worstpolluted.org/pro
jectsreports/display/66 (last visited Nov. 16, 2013).
108. PERCIVAL, supra note 72, at 33 (citing the financial and health benefits that resulted from the
EPA’s phasedown of lead additives in gasoline).
109. Al Alm, The Multimedia Approach to Pollution Control: An Impossible Dream?, in
MULTIMEDIA APPROACHES TO POLLUTION CONTROL: A SYMPOSIUM PROCEEDINGS 114, 115 (1987).
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B.

Public Participation in the Regulatory Process in China
In China regulations are issued with little public input by the State
Council, a body that is considered a separate branch of government under
the Chinese Constitution. Because Chinese environmental regulations are
not the product of fierce lobbying and compromise between affected
interests and regulatory authorities, it seems hardly surprising that they are
not taken as seriously by the regulated community as in the U.S.
1. Public Participation in Accordance with China’s Administrative
Regulations

Public participation in the area of administrative regulations means
systems and mechanisms through which relevant governmental entities
allow and encourage interested parties and ordinary citizens to share their
opinions in the process of administrative legislation and decision. These
opinions are sought to further enhance justice and the rationality of
administrative actions. In China this is a significant element in efforts to
promote the rule of law and adherence to law by administrative agencies.110
To ordinary citizens, public participation is a mechanism of interest
expression.
Article 58 of the registration law of PRC provides that “In drafting
administrative regulations, opinions from relevant organs, organizations
and citizens shall be widely listened to, and forums, seminars, hearings, etc.
may be held for the purpose.”111 Thus, gathering of opinions may be in
various forms such as panel discussions, feasibility study meetings,
hearings, or other forms.112
Public participation is increasingly welcomed by the government and
more frequently mentioned in the documents of the State Council. The
article of “Guidelines of Comprehensively Promoting Administration by
Law,” issued by the State Council in 2004, requires improvement in the
way the public participates in the development of government legislation
and broader public participation.113 The article of “Opinions on
110. The Law on Legislation of the People's Republic of China (promulgated by Order No. 31 of
the President of the People’s Republic of China, Mar. 15, 2000, effective July 1, 2000), Article 1, 58,
translated in LEGISLATION LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT NO.
31, CHINESE GOVERNMENT’S OFFICIAL WEB PORTAL (Mar. 15, 2013), available at
http://english.gov.cn/laws/2005-08/20/content_29724.htm.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Guidelines of Comprehensively Promoting Administration by Law, STATE COUNCIL (Aug. 31,
2006), http://www.gov.cn/ztzl/yfxz/content_374160.htm (announcing that part 5 and other articles
require improvement in the way the public participates in the development of government legislation
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Strengthening the Establishment of Government by Law issued by the State
Council” in 2010, emphasizes that government legislation should strictly
comply with legal jurisdiction and procedures.114 It also requires
improvements in the systems and mechanisms of public participation to
guarantee that public opinions can be fully expressed and that legitimate
rights can be fully realized.115
2. Practices by the Public, Especially Environmental NGOs
Compared with the development of legislative initiatives,
environmental NGOs have more opportunities to participate in the
implementation of legislation because of legal guarantees. But to make the
public voice heard in the NPC, contacting representatives is not the only
way. Environmental NGOs can seek to influence legislation by promoting
their ideas concerning specific legislation,116 by encouraging public
response to the call from the MEP or other legislative and administrative
entities,117 and by using both platforms of official bureaus and civic society
themselves.118
3. Strong Public Dissatisfaction with Environmental Conditions and
Efforts to Improve Current Regulations
During the meeting of the NPC and CPPCC in Beijing in early 2013,
rare dissent surfaced when the NPC elected the members of the NPC’s

and broader public participation).
114. Opinions on Strengthening the Establishment of Government by Law, STATE COUNCIL (2010)
http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2010/content_1745842.htm (announcing that part 4 and other
articles emphasize that government legislation should strictly comply with legal jurisdiction and
procedures).
115. The Law on Legislation of the People's Republic of China (promulgated by Order No. 31 of
the President of the People’s Republic of China, Mar. 15, 2000, effective July 1, 2000), Article 5,
translated in LEGISLATION LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT NO.
31, CHINESE GOVERNMENT’S OFFICIAL WEB PORTAL (Mar. 15, 2013), available at
http://english.gov.cn/laws/2005-08/20/content_29724.htm.
116. For example, many NGOs proposed regulatory initiatives and some directly put forward
detailed drafts of laws. During the modification of the civil procedure law of PRC, “numerous
environmental organizations and individual citizens . . . submitted their views.” The Top Ten Events of
Public Participation in Environmental Protection in 2012, CPPCC (Apr. 18, 2013),
http://cppcc.people.com.cn/n/2013/0418/c34948-21177179.html. See also Christine Xu, Didn’t Think
China had Bottom-Up Activism? Think Again, NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL (July 8, 2013),
http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/cxu/didnt_think_china_had_bottom-u.html.
117. CPPCC, supra note 116.
118. Id.
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Environmental and Resources Protection Committee.119 Up to 850
representatives voted “no”, which means that one-third of the total
representatives refused to vote for them, considering the 125 who refused
to vote.120 The voting results astonished the representatives in the Great
Hall and also drew accolades from some media. This unusual level of
dissent reflected dissatisfaction of people from all walks of life in China. It
can be predicted that in the future the public, especially organized NGOs,
will play a larger role in initiating environmental legislation.
Although no relevant regulations can be found on public participation
in legislative initiatives at the national legislative level, there have been
some breakthroughs in recent years at the local level. For example, in 2006
the Guangzhou Municipal Government enacted the “Measure of the Public
Participation in Legislation of Regulations in Guangzhou” (“the Measure”)
that became effective from January 1, 2007.121 Few particular local
governmental regulations address public participation in administrative
legislation.122 In 2012 the Guangzhou Municipal Government amended the
Measure to improve the procedures for public participation.123 The Measure
has 37 articles in five chapters, mainly addressing public participation in
regulation drafting, examination, and execution.124
Though few local governmental regulations in China regulate public
participation in administrative legislation, many other local governments
also have relevant procedures for public participation in drafting local
regulations. For example, the “Regulations of Hunan Administration
Procedures (2008)” fully reflect that government’s arrangement regarding
public participation in regulatory decisions.125 Currently, 29 provinciallevel governments will collect opinions openly before drafting local

119. Li Jing & Verna Yu, New Environmental Team Booed Amid Pollution Woes, S. CHINA
MORNING POST (Mar. 17, 2013, 5:59 AM), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1192581/newenvironmental-team-booed-amid-pollution-woes.
120. Id.
121. The Measures of the Public Participation in Legislation of Regulations in Guangzhou, LEGAL
EDUC. NETWORK (Oct. 26, 2010), http://www.chinalawedu.com/falvfagui/1200a21752aaaa2010/
20101223wangyo14144.shtml. See also Guangzhou Municipal Measures on Public Participation in
Formulating Rules (promulgated by the Guangzhou Municipal Government Standing Committee, June
27, 2006, effective Jan. 1, 2007) (China).
122. During the writing of this paper, another provincial level regulation named “Public
participation in formulating local regulations” was issued by Gansu province on July 26, 2013, effective
October 1, 2013. See Gansu Provincial People’s Congress Standing Committee Notice, CPC NEWS
(Oct. 4, 2013, 4:53 PM), http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2013/1004/c64387-23104941.html.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Hunan Provincial Procedure Provisions (promulgated by the Hunan Provincial People’s
Government, Apr. 9, 2008, effective Oct. 1, 2008) (China).
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regulations and rules.126 A total of 18 provinces, cities, and autonomous
regions, including Beijing and Tianjin, have regulations on collecting
opinions openly and holding hearings relating to provincial-level
regulations when drafting local regulations and rules.127 At the same time
the other 11 provinces, cities, and autonomous regions have relevant
regulations in the form of regulative documents, working rules of legal
offices or systems approved by provincial governments.128 Systems
supporting public participation in local administrative legislation are
gradually taking form.129
Conceptually, issues regarding NGO organization and public
participation in the regulatory process are no longer obstacles. However,
much still must be done to improve public participation including: (1)
broadening participation in national-level and local rulemaking to establish
more specific regulations, (2) reducing excessive formalism, which is a
serious problem in many kinds of public decisions and which reduces the
effectiveness of public participation, requiring a more reasonable design of
the system, (3) more professional training of NGO representatives to
improve their organization’s ability to influence regulatory decisions, and
(4) greater sincerity in implementing the relevant systems by administrators
and legislators at all levels.130
V. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS
Virtually every significant environmental regulation promulgated in
the U.S. is challenged in court by the regulated industry and/or
environmental interests. With gridlock in Congress precluding the
enactment of new environmental legislation, the judiciary has become a
more important battleground between regulatory targets and the
beneficiaries of regulation. Although the U.S. Supreme Court has
instructed lower courts to defer to decisions by executive agencies
interpreting ambiguous statutory provisions,131 some agencies and some

126. Hong Zhang (张红), Public Participation in Administrative Legislation: Institutional
Innovation
and
Prospects,
ADMIN.
REFORM
(July
20,
2011,
9:08
AM),
http://www.cntheory.com/news/Dshclsfb/2011/720/117209812K244BBI183BC1C5HE6G6.html.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Feilong Tian, Public Participation: From The System Principle to the System Details (Mar.
25, 2013), http://www.publiclaw.cn/article/Details.asp?NewsId=4224&classid=22&classname=公民参
与立法.
131. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984).

Percival -Final (Do Not Delete)

7/21/2014 4:28 PM

164

[Vol. XXIV:141

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

types of regulation seem to receive more deference than others.132 The
judiciary also has used doctrines of standing to make it more difficult for
NGOs to challenge certain types of agency actions.133 By contrast, the
Chinese judiciary plays virtually no role in influencing agency decisions
because regulations issued by the State Council generally are not subject to
judicial review.134
A.

United States
The judicial system has played an important role in developing U.S.
environmental policy through judicial review of agency regulatory
decisions. The U.S. Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the federal
environmental statutes generally authorize judicial review of agency action
at the behest of anyone adversely affected by it.135 As adopted in 1946, the
APA was a compromise that sought to balance the interests of the public in
effective regulation with those of the regulated community by making it
easier for agencies to issue regulations while providing greater access to
judicial review as a check on agency action.136
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has instructed lower courts to defer
to agency interpretations of ambiguous regulatory statutes,137 significant
regulatory initiatives have been derailed by the courts. Despite
overwhelming proof of harm to health caused by tobacco products, when
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) sought to regulate them
stringently, the U.S. Supreme Court, by a 5-4 vote, rejected the agency’s
finding that cigarettes were “drug delivery devices” for nicotine that could
be regulated by the agency.138
In 1989, after a decade-long investigation, EPA issued a regulation
phasing out nearly all remaining uses of asbestos.139 The agency concluded
132. See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. CHI.
L. REV. 761, 796–97 (2008); David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 183–84 (2010).
133. See, e.g., Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (2009); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555 (1992).
134. RACHEL E. STERN, ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION IN CHINA: A STUDY IN POLITICAL
AMBIVALENCE 212 (Chris Arup et al. eds., 2013).
135. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006) (“A person suffering legal wrong
because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a
relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.”).
136. See McNollgast, The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J. L. ECON. &
ORG. 180 (1999).
137. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984).
138. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 131, 160–61 (2000) (“Congress
has directly spoken to the question at issue and precluded the FDA from regulating tobacco products.”).
139. Asbestos: Manufacture, Importation, Processing, and Distribution in Commerce Prohibitions,
54 Fed. Reg. 29, 460 (July 12, 1989) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 763).
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that only a phaseout “will adequately control” the life cycle of asbestos
exposure risks that occur whenever the substance is mined, used in
manufacturing, released into the environment through deteriorating
asbestos-containing products, or is disposed.140 Despite the welldocumented dangers of asbestos, this regulation was struck down by a
reviewing court which concluded that the agency had failed to perform
sufficiently detailed cost-benefit analyses of banning not only each
particular use of asbestos, but also of all intermediate alternatives short of a
ban.141 The court required such highly detailed proof, on a product-byproduct basis, that benefits outweighed costs, as to render the Toxic
Substances Control Act virtually impotent as a regulatory tool.142
Despite some judicial reversals of important regulatory initiatives, the
regulatory infrastructure of U.S. environmental law generally has survived
persistent legal attacks. In 2001 the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously
rejected an industry argument that unless the Clean Air Act was interpreted
to require that regulations be based on cost-benefit analyses it would be an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to the executive.143 In
2007 the Court, by a 5-4 vote in Massachusetts v. EPA, ordered EPA to
reconsider its refusal to regulate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions as
arbitrary and capricious.144 As a result of this decision, the EPA was able to
promulgate regulations controlling GHG emissions under the existing
Clean Air Act, even though efforts to enact new legislation establishing a
comprehensive cap-and-trade program had failed. In June 2012 a panel of
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit unanimously rejected all
industry challenges to these regulations in a decision deferring to EPA’s
findings concerning the contribution of GHG emissions to global warming
and climate change.145
B.

China
Chinese law does not authorize private parties to seek judicial review

140. Id. at 29,468.
141. See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 947 F.2d 1201, 1229 (5th Cir. 1991)
(“[EPA’s] explicit failure to consider the alternatives required of it by Congress deprived its final rule
of the reasonable basis it needed to survive judicial scrutiny.”).
142. See id. While the Corrosion Proof Fittings decision effectively precluded EPA from banning
existing uses of asbestos, most other developed countries have done so, and the World Trade
Organization (WTO) has upheld such bans in light of the demonstrated dangers of asbestos. E.g.,
Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and AsbestosContaining Products, ¶ 192(b), WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001).
143. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns., 531 U.S. 457, 458, 475–76 (2001).
144. Massachusetts v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 534 (2007).
145. Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 684 F.3d 102, 113 (D.C.
Cir. 2012) (per curiam).
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of regulatory decisions by the State Council. In 2003 two judges in Henan
province were fired as a result of a decision that struck down a provincial
regulation as inconsistent with national law.146 This received national
attention in China, providing a strong signal to other judges that aggressive
judicial review was unwelcome in China.
VI. ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT AND CITIZEN SUITS
In the U.S., environmental enforcement relies heavily on selfmonitoring by regulated industries, supplemented by government
inspections. But nearly all the federal environmental laws provide for
citizen suits that can be brought either against government agencies who
fail to perform non-discretionary duties, such as meeting statutory
deadlines for issuing regulations, or against polluters who violate their
permits.147 As noted above, citizen suits against government officials
initially played a key role in forcing U.S. agencies to issue regulations to
implement the environmental laws. However, except in Clean Water Act
cases they have not been used frequently to enforce the environmental laws
against polluters because of the difficulty of proving violations.
Despite determination at the national level to upgrade environmental
performance, Chinese officials have had a difficult time enforcing their
environmental laws because their legal system is so decentralized with
local environmental protection boards having most of the enforcement
power.148 China’s Ministry of Environmental Protection has only 300
employees (compared to 17,000 employees at the U.S. EPA) and it
regularly loses bureaucratic battles to the powerful National Development
and Reform Commission.149 Chinese environmental laws do not expressly
provide for citizen suits, though determined public interest lawyers still are
bringing lawsuits asking courts to stop pollution and to compensate
victims. The creation of environmental courts in some Chinese provinces
and legal reforms to facilitate class actions ultimately may make such
lawsuits easier to win. But Chinese courts remain beholden to the wishes
of the Communist Party and routinely refuse to hear cases that the Party
does not want to be heard. This is illustrated by the refusal of Chinese

146. STERN, supra note 134, at 212.
147. See PERCIVAL, supra note 72, at 1122–23.
148. MCELWEE, supra note 4, at 5.
149. Id. at 84; How Many People Work for the EPA?, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://publicaccess.supportportal.com/link/portal/23002/23012/Article/17588/How-many-people-workfor-the-EPA (last modified May 7, 2013).
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courts to hear lawsuits by fishermen harmed by the Bohai Bay oil spill.150
A.

United States
In the U.S., government enforcement authorities rely heavily on selfmonitoring and self-reporting requirements to detect violations of the
environmental laws. The pollution control statutes generally authorize EPA
to impose monitoring, recordkeeping, and reporting requirements on
dischargers.151 Under the Clean Water Act, dischargers of water pollutants
are required to monitor their discharges on a regular basis and to file
discharge monitoring reports (DMRs) that are available to the public. When
self-reported violations are included in DMRs, it is relatively easy for
regulatory authorities or citizen groups to bring successful enforcement
actions. Recognizing the danger that sources will not report adverse
monitoring data truthfully, regulatory authorities prosecute reporting
violations with vigor. When false reporting or tampering with monitoring
data has been discovered, criminal prosecutions often follow. To make it
possible to uncover false reports, the environmental laws generally give
enforcement officials the right to conduct inspections.152
Recognizing that federal agencies had a long history of
unresponsiveness to environmental concerns, Congress sought to enlist
citizens in the tasks of ensuring that the laws were implemented and
enforced properly. It did so by authorizing citizen suits, a major innovation
first incorporated in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970153and included
in virtually all the major environmental laws Congress subsequently
adopted.154 These provisions generally allow citizens to act as “private
attorney generals” to supplement government enforcement against those
who violate environmental regulations.155 They “generally authorize ‘any
person’ to commence an action against ‘any person’ alleged to be in
violation of the laws.”156 These citizen suit provisions require citizens to

150. 500 Fishermen of Shandong Claimed Against Conoco Phillips, a U.S. Court Hearing, CHINA
NETWORK (Apr. 3, 2013), http://news.china.com.cn/live/2013-04/03/content_19360353.htm; Gong Jing
& Cui Zheng, The Dark Patch on Bohai Bay, CHINA-WIRE (Dec. 26, 2011), http://chinawire.org/?p=17854.
151. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1318–19 (2006).
152. ENVTL. LAW INST., A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO USING FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS TO
SECURE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 22–23 (2002), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance
/ej/resources/reports/annual-project-reports/citizen_guide_ej.pdf.
153. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2006).
154. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2006), Water Act and Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (2006).
155. PERCIVAL, supra note 72, at 1123.
156. Id.
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notify the alleged violator and federal and state authorities prior to filing
suit. Sixty days’ notice usually is required, although the amount of notice
can vary for certain violations.157 The citizen suit provisions usually specify
that if federal or state authorities are diligently prosecuting an action to
require compliance, filing of a citizen suit is barred, though citizens are
authorized to intervene in federal enforcement actions as of right.158
Citizen enforcement actions against private parties who violated
environmental regulations were rarely filed during the 1970s. This changed
in 1982 due to concern over a dramatic decline in governmental
enforcement efforts during the early years of the Reagan administration.
The NRDC “initiated a national project to use citizen suits to fill the
enforcement void.”159 NRDC’s project focused on enforcement of the
Clean Water Act because it was easy to prove violations of this Act through
discharge monitoring reports (DMRs) filed by polluters.160 These reports
are “available to the public and can serve as prima facie evidence of
NPDES permit violations.”161 Joined by local environmental groups,
NRDC systematically scrutinized DMRs, sent 60-day notice letters to
dischargers who reported violations of permit limits, and then filed citizen
suits. As a result of this project, the total number of citizen suits brought
under the Clean Water Act increased from six in 1981 to 62 in 1983,
surpassing the 56 Clean Water Act cases referred by EPA to the Justice
Department for prosecution that year.162
Citizen suits became relatively easy to win because of the selfreported violations contained in the DMRs. Several courts rejected efforts
to create new defenses to such suits (including claims that discharge
monitoring reports prepared by defendants were too unreliable to serve as
the basis for violations or that they violated the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination).163 Dischargers protested vehemently (the
general counsel of the Chemical Manufacturers Association complained
that his members never would have agreed to more aggressive permit

157. For example, section 505(b) of the Clean Water Act (officially codified as 33 U.S.C. §
1365(b)(2) (2006)) authorizes suits alleging violations of NSPS requirements or toxic effluent standards
to be brought immediately after notice, as does section 7002(b)(1)(A) of the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA) (officially codified as 42 U.S.C. § 6972(c) (2006)) for violations of RCRA
subtitle C.
158. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B).
159. PERCIVAL, supra note 72, at 1130.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Jeffrey G. Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control Laws Part III, 14 ENVTL.
L. REP. 10,407, 10,424 (1984).
163. PERCIVAL, supra note 72, at 1131.
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provisions if they had known that their permits were going to be enforced),
In 1984 EPA commissioned a comprehensive study of citizen suits.164 The
study found that citizen suits had been operating in a manner generally
consistent with the goals of the environmental statutes by both stimulating
and supplementing government enforcement.165 The study rejected the
notion that citizen suits had interfered with government enforcement efforts
or that they had focused on trivial violations.166
B.

China
1. NGOs’ Non-Litigation Roles in Environmental Enforcement

NGOs can play a role in the implementation and enforcement of
Chinese environmental law. The implementation of law by Chinese NGOs
can be divided into two parts: litigating on behalf of the public after an
environmental incident and efforts to enforce the environmental laws
during administrative processes. The latter mainly includes supervision of
the implementation of the government’s environmental policies and
promoting corporate responsibility.
As social organizations, environmental NGOs can develop their own
proposals and views to some extent, and express their opinions during the
administrative process. Efforts to influence public opinion are the most
common strategy employed by Chinese environmental NGOs. For
example, in 2003 Chinese NGOs effectively organized public opposition to
a proposal by a state-owned corporation to build 13 dams on the Nu River.
As a result of widespread protests, the project was suspended by thenPremier Wen Jiabao in 2004. In 2012 Chinese NGOs succeeded in bringing
several construction projects to a halt for failure to comply with
environmental impact assessment requirements.”167
164. Id.
165. ENVTL. LAW INST., CITIZEN SUITS: AN ANALYSIS OF CITIZEN ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
UNDER EPA-ADMINISTERED STATUTES, at v, ix (1984).
166. Other studies of the impact of citizen suit provisions in the environmental laws were presented
in April 2003 at a symposium at Widener University School of Law. The symposium on
“Environmental Citizen Suits at Thirty something: A Celebration & Summit” featured leading figures in
the citizen suit movement who discussed its history and current status. See e.g. Karl S. Coplan, Is
Citizen Suit Notice Jurisdictional and Why Does it Matter?, 10 WIDENER L. REV. 49 (2003); James R.
May, Now More than Ever: Trends in Environmental Citizen Suits at 30, 10 WIDENER L. REV. 1 (2003);
Jeffrey G. Miller, Overlooked Issues in the “Diligent Prosecution” Citizen Suit Preclusion, 10
WIDENER L. REV. 63 (2003).
167. The Top Ten Events of Public Participation in Environmental Protection in 2012, supra note
116. For a description of the environmental impact assessment process for construction, see MCELWEE,
supra note 4, at 130.
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In 2012, pervasive environmental pollution and food safety problems
drew more and more attention to heavy metal in the soil, PM2.5 in the air,
unsafe drinking water, and invisible nuclear radiation. Gathering and
publishing environmental data through mobile devices has become a new
way for the public to participate in environmental protection.168 Monitoring
activities by private parties have been inspired by greater public concern
over the quality of the living environment. These activities also can be seen
as a way to spur professional institutions and government officials to
disclose information and to take positive measures to protect the
environment. These activities enhance the public’s enthusiasm for
participation in environmental protection. Environmental monitoring
activities are listed among the top ten elements of the public’s participation
in environmental protection.169
Another clear trend in China is that environmental NGOs are starting
to take on some governance roles that originally belonged to the
government by helping to monitor compliance with environmental
regulations.170 This could mean that the government may relinquish some
environmental management functions that could be performed by NGOs.
As the government begins to cede some of its role to the NGOs, the
government can focus more on macroeconomic regulation and general
control, eventually enlisting NGOs to be a de facto constraint on executive
power.
The All China Environmental Federation (ACEF), a governmentendorsed NGO, is a social organization that can play an important role in
monitoring official action to ensure that the government performs its
responsibility to protect the environment. After ACEF receives
environmental complaints, it can conduct an on-the-spot investigation and
use media exposure to publicize environmental problems.171 ACEF then
can send a proposal letter to the relevant administrative department
responsible for protecting the environment. Using these methods, ACEF
has responded effectively to 16 cases of pollution problems, promoting
local government administration according to law, and supervising
polluting enterprises to eliminate the pollution problem and maintain public
environmental rights and interests.172
ACEF has played a very useful role in promoting compliance with
environmental regulations. Cases it has handled often are publicized in
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See Introduction, ALL CHINA ENV’T FED’N, supra note 45.
Id.
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media reports by the Xinhua News Agency or CCTV. ACEF’s lawyers
wrote to China’s top leaders to get attention from all levels of the
government.173 ACEF is particularly valuable because its members know
China’s national conditions deeply, and they can find the most workable
methods for resolving pollution disputes through monitoring and site
investigation that then are reported by media and to officials.174
2. NGOs’ Roles in Bringing Citizen Suits—ACEF’s Recent Attempt
a. In China Only ACEF is Active in Bringing Public Interests Suits
ACEF’s achievements on citizen suits are remarkable. As a civil
society organization, ACEF brought and won a lawsuit against Xiuwen
County Environmental Protection Bureau for malfeasance in failing to
provide environmental information to the public.175 ACEF completed the
nation’s first public environmental interest litigation with a social
organization as plaintiff.176 It brought a lawsuit against Dingpa Paper Mill
of Wudang district of Huiyang and eventually won the case.177 In these
proceedings, ACEF’s strategy employed some legal innovations, including
bringing the litigation in the special court of environmental protection,
preserving evidence, using professional people’s jurors, and having
litigation costs borne by the defendant for the first time in an environmental
case.178
b. Legislation to Facilitate Environmental Public Interest Litigation
For many reasons, it is very difficult to bring public interest litigation
in China. An important source of this difficulty is standing requirements for
plaintiffs. The standing requirements of traditional civil law were too strict,
requiring that only the direct victim can bring a lawsuit.179 At the end of
2012 the Civil Procedure Law was amended to provide for a system of
public interest litigation by modifying the provisions of Article 55.180
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Briefing on Environmental Rights Services for the Public in 2011, ACEF (Feb. 13, 2012,
11:22 AM), http://gongyi.163.com/12/0213/11/7Q504CLB00933KC8.html.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. STERN, supra note 134, at 47.
180. Sheng Zhang, Legislative Development in China in 2012, CHINESE J. COMP. L., Dec. 2010, at

Percival -Final (Do Not Delete)

7/21/2014 4:28 PM

172

[Vol. XXIV:141

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

Relevant bodies and organizations prescribed by the law may now bring a
suit to the People’s Court against such acts as environmental pollution,
harm to the consumer’s legitimate interests and rights, and other acts that
undermine the social and public interest. The environmental NGOs’
standing to bring environmental public interest litigation has been
confirmed. Yet unfortunately individuals are not expressly authorized to
bring public interest litigation under these amendments, even though much
of China’s environmental public interest litigation has been brought on
behalf of private citizens.181
Because ACEF has the endorsement of the Chinese government182 and
employs lawyers with a fairly strong technical and legal background, it has
had greater success in bringing environmental public interest litigation than
any other NGO in China.183 However, the recent draft revisions of China’s
environmental protection law have placed ACEF in an awkward position.
On June 26th, 2013, draft amendments to the Environmental Protection Law
were submitted to the NPC Standing Committee meeting for secondary
consideration.184 Among these amendments, one draft article caused heated
debate: “For the actions of environmental pollution, or ecological damage,
which harm public interests, All-China Environment Federation and this
organization established in the provinces, autonomous regions and
municipalities, can bring a suit to a people’s court.”185 Many professionals
questioned this amendment because it would effectively give ACEF a
monopoly over environmental public interest litigation. They argued that
this was contrary to the intent of the amendment of Civil Procedural Law in
2012. After that amendment, § 55 provides that “Legally designated
institutions and relevant organizations may initiate proceedings at the
competent people’s court . . . .”186
While puzzling to most observers, the draft amendment to narrow
standing to bring public interest environmental litigation may have been
13.
181. Announcement of China Top Ten Public Interest Litigation in 2012 (Jan. 30, 2013, 12:01 AM),
http://www.legalweekly.cn/index.php/Index/article/id/2000.
182. The majority of the ACEF leadership are retired senior government officials. See The Chinese
ACEF is Hard on Behalf of the Public Interest, NANDU (June 27, 2013),
http://nandu.oeeee.com/nis/201306/27/71505.html.
183. Briefing on Environmental Rights Services for the Public in 2011, supra note 176.
184. Environmental Protection Amendment Act Provisions, NPC (July 17, 2013),
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/lfgz/flca/2013-07/17/content_1801189.htm.
185. Id.
186. XX (XX) [Laws of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 31, 2012, effective Jan. 1, 2013) P.R.C. LAWS (China). CHINA AMENDS
CIVIL
PROCEDURE
LAW
FOLLOWING
THIRD
READING,
GOV.CN (AUG. 12, 2012),
http://english.gov.cn/2012-08/31/content_2214483.htm.
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caused by the following. First, because public interest litigation is difficult,
the drafters of the amendment may have thought that many other
organizations’ “capacities are too shabby.”187 Secondly, some officials are
concerned about the potential for abuse of public interest litigation.188 Thus,
they are very cautious about expanding the parties that could bring such
cases for fear that it might substantially increase the amount of such
litigation.
It is possible that the drafters of the amendment confounded
distinctions between the right to litigate and the capacity to handle
litigation. Those bringing China’s rare environmental public interest cases
face the depressing reality that courts frequently reject environmental
complaints. This could be a much more serious barrier than their
organization’s capacity to handle litigation. Indeed, three public interest
lawsuits brought by ACEF in 2013 were all rejected by courts instead of
being decided on the merits.189 Officials also may be overanxious because
public interest litigation may encourage tougher enforcement action than
they believe is desirable. The complexities of environmental litigation,
limited judicial expertise, scant resources to pay public interest lawyers,
and other problems make any surge in environmental public litigations
almost impossible in the short term.
It was anticipated that the amendments to the Civil Procedure Law
would expand organizational standing to bring public interest litigation
beyond what is allowed in the U.S. However, the draft amendments to the
Environmental Law that would allow only ACEF to bring such lawsuits
would greatly limit such lawsuits. Thus, they ignited a storm of controversy
and it was widely expected that the draft would be changed.190 China’s
environmental movement is increasing in importance throughout the
country and broadening standing and the right to bring actions to other
NGOs is widely viewed as a vital step towards increasing public
participation.191

187. Song Yangbiao, Not Single Running, Not Let Go Boldly, TIME WEEKLY,
http://www.dooland.com/magazine/article_287053.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2013).
188. Environmental Public Interest Litigation Should be Filed by ACEF, THE BEIJING NEWS, June
27, 2013, at A8, available at http://epaper.bjnews.com.cn/html/2013-06/27/content_443459.htm?div=1.
189. Qie Jianrong (郄建荣), Lack of Judicial Interpretation, The New Civil Procedure Facing
Embarrassments, LEGAL DAILY, June 20, 2013, at 6.
190. During a meeting with Professor Percival in Beijing in August 2013, top officials of ACEF
expressed embarrassment at the draft amendment and emphasized that they had not sought it and did
not believe that they should be given a monopoly over public interest environmental litigation.
191. Wang Dianxue, Environmental Public Interest Litigation Brought by the All-China
Environment Federation "Exclusively"?, S. METRO. DAILY, June 27, 2013, at A5.
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On October 21, 2013, a reporter learned that a third, revised draft of
amendments to the Environmental Protection Law had been submitted to
the National People’s Congress committee. The revised draft contains three
conditions for bringing public interest environmental litigation. First, the
qualified organization must be registered with the civil affairs department
under the State Council. Second, it must have specialized in environmental
protection public activities for more than five consecutive years. Third, it
must have a good reputation.192 One insider who worked on the revisions
stated that, with these conditions, the number of qualified organizations in
China that could bring public interest litigation would be less than ten.
Because it is very difficult for civil society organizations to be registered
with the civil affairs department, these conditions still will be very harsh
for grass-root environmental NGOs.193
3. China’s Environmental Protests and the “NIMBY Movement”
In July 2012, in Shifang, Sichuan Province, the public’s fear of
pollution from a molybdenum-copper project gradually evolved into
protests.194 During the same month, in Qidong, in Jiangsu Province people
were worried that Japan’s oji paper group project would affect the sea
ecosystem and inshore aquaculture.195 Tens of thousands of citizens rallied
to demonstrate against the project. In October 2012, in Ningbo,Zhejiang
Province, there were large-scale protests against expansion of a PX
(paraxylene) chemical plant. In these cases, public opposition has led to the
projects being suspended or relocated.196
In May 2011, in Guizhou,Qingzhen Province,a director of a roofing
waterproof glue factory, named Long Xingguang, poured eight tons of
toxic chemical waste in liquid form into sewage.197 After prosecution, Long
Xingguang was sentenced to prison for two and a half years.198 Cai
Changhai, leader of the public environmental education center in Guiyang,
then brought a civil action in his own name to require Long to provide
1.073 million yuan as compensation for the pollution.199 He claimed the

192. Litigation Subject on Environmental Public Interest Falling into "Seesaw Battle", BEIJING
YOUTH DAILY, Oct. 28, 2013, at A4.
193. Id.
194. Announcement of China Top Ten Public Interest Litigation in 2012, supra note 181.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
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right to seek compensation for harm caused by the pollution to the East
Gate River within the jurisdiction of the Qingzhen municipality.200 The
court accepted this lawsuit, indicating the power of public controversy to
increase the willingness of courts to accept cases.201
VII. NGOS AND TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVES
In the U.S., the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know
Act (EPCRA) requires annual disclosures of toxic releases by most large
companies that must be made available to the public in a Toxics Release
Inventory (TRI).202 U.S. NGOs have used this information to pressure
companies to reduce such releases. Chinese NGOs, led by Goldman
Environmental Prize winner Ma Jun’s Institute for Public and
Environmental Affairs (IPE), have conducted labor and environmental
compliance audits of the Chinese supply chains of multinational electronics
companies.203 By publicizing the results of these audits, these NGOs have
persuaded Apple and Hewlett Packard to agree to regular audits by
independent entities.204 In partnership with the NRDC, these NGOs also
have released annual ratings of how well Chinese municipalities are
implementing the provisions of the 2008 Open Information Law, which
mimics the U.S. Freedom of Information Act.205 This creative strategy has
helped provide incentives for local officials to take the law more seriously.
Increasing protests over environmental conditions by the Chinese public
have improved prospects for China adopting some form of a pollution
release and transfer registry like the U.S. TRI.206
A.

United States
In December 1984 an accidental release of methyl isocynate at a

200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act § 313, 42 U.S.C. § 11023 (2012)
(all companies with ten or more full-time employees are subject to this provision).
203. See e.g., FRIENDS OF NATURE, IPE, GREEN BEAGLE, THE OTHER SIDE OF APPLE (2011),
available at http://www.ipe.org.cn/Upload/Report-IT-V-Apple-I-EN.pdf.
204. Katie Marsal, Apple to Allow Independent Audits of Its Supply Chain, APPLE INSIDER (Feb.
21,
2012,
7:09
AM),
http://appleinsider.com/articles/12/02/21/apple_to_allow_independe
nt_environmental_audits_of_its_supply_chain.
205. ALEX WANG, NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, CUTTING THROUGH THE FOG WITH CHINA’S
FIRST POLLUTION INFORMATION TRANSPARENCY INDEX (PITI) 1 (2009), available at
http://www.nrdc.org/international/piti/files/chinapiti.pdf.
206. Barbara Finamore, A Step Forward for Environmental Transparency in China, SWITCHBOARD
(Mar. 29, 2013), http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/bfinamore/a_step_forward_for_environment.html.
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chemical plant owned by the Union Carbide Corporation in Bhopal, India
killed more than 3,000 people and severely injured of thousands of
others.207 Congress ultimately responded not by enacting new controls on
toxic emissions, but rather by adopting legislation requiring comprehensive
emergency planning and the reporting of chemical releases.208 This
legislation is known as the Emergency Planning and Community Right to
Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA).209 It requires companies to file annual reports
disclosing their releases of hundreds of toxic chemicals.210 This data must
be made available to the public in what has come to be known as the
Toxics Release Inventory.
When the first TRI was released, EPA officials were shocked by the
large volume of reported releases.211 Community organizations and
environmental groups used the data to support calls for stronger regulation.
During the first week after the TRI became available through the National
Library of Medicine, the Library received 225 requests for subscriptions,
most from community groups and ordinary citizens.212 On August 1, 1989,
USA Today published a two-page list of “The Toxic 500,” the U.S. counties
with the most pollution from industrial chemicals as reported in the TRI.213
The National Wildlife Federation published a book identifying the 500
largest dischargers, who released more than 7.5 billion pounds of toxics,
including 39 known or probable carcinogens.214 NRDC used the data to
prepare “A Who’s Who of American Toxic Air Polluters,” identifying
more than 1,500 major sources of toxic air emissions.215 Subsequent
updates of the TRI have continued to receive wide publicity and many
community groups have used the TRI to issue reports publicizing local
polluters. The EDF created an interactive pollution locator that used TRI
data to permit individuals to obtain information on the Internet about
sources of pollution in their communities.216 By entering their zip code,
individuals could find out what chemicals were released by which sources
207. PERCIVAL, supra note 72, at 339.
208. Id.
209. Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 300,
100 Stat. 1613 (1986); 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001–50.
210. PERCIVAL, supra note 72, at 341.
211. Id.
212. Roberto Suro, Grass-Roots Groups Show Power Battling Pollution Close to Home, N.Y.
TIMES, July 2, 1989, at A1.
213. USA Today, The Top 500 Counties: The Most Common Chemicals, USA TODAY, Aug. 1,
1989, at A6.
214. See G. POJE, THE TOXIC 500 T.1 (1988).
215. PERCIVAL, supra note 72, at 341.
216. See Pollution in Your Community, SCORECARD, http://scorecard.goodguide.com (last visited
Nov. 16, 2013).
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in their neighborhoods, information about what is known concerning the
potential health effects of the chemicals, and how the emissions rank
relative to facilities in other parts of the country. By clicking on a link on
the website, citizens could send free faxes complaining about the emissions
to facilities whose releases were among the highest 20% in the nation.
The TRI has proven invaluable in providing information to inform
public policy and public debate over those policies. For instance, Congress
relied heavily on TRI data in specifying the 189 toxic chemicals required to
be regulated as hazardous air pollutants in the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments.217 EPA has used the TRI as the cornerstone of its pollution
prevention strategy and as a means for improving the effectiveness of
existing regulatory programs.218 TRI data has also figured prominently in
debates over environmental justice, helping researchers employ an array of
tools to identify the extent to which environmental exposures may be
visited in a disproportionate fashion on certain segments of the
population.219
TRI backers believed that providing information about toxics releases
from facilities to the communities nearby those facilities would prompt
firms to change their behavior in ways that reduced the amount of those
releases. The evidence to date bears out this expectation. Following the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the Blue Plains Wastewater Treatment
Plant that serves Washington, D.C. discontinued its use of liquid chlorine
that had been stored in 90-ton tanker cars at its plant located only four
miles from the U.S. Capitol. This action was taken after the TRI revealed
the storage of this highly dangerous chemical in tanker cars that, if
ruptured, could quickly spread a toxic cloud killing thousands of people
within a 10-mile radius.220 Some environmental groups are citing terrorism
concerns as further justification to push industry to shift production
processes to use inherently safer chemicals.

B.

China’s Outstanding Breakthrough on Transparency of Information
1. Information Disclosure Strategies by Chinese NGOs

217. PERCIVAL, supra note 72, at 341.
218. Id, at 341–42.
219. Id. at 342.
220. Carol D. Leonnig & Spencer S. Hsu, Fearing Attack, Blue Plains Ceases Toxic Chemical Use,
WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 2001, at A1.
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Two innovative strategies employed by Chinese NGOs focus on
information disclosure. First, working with NRDC’s Beijing office, IPE in
Beijing has released annual rankings of how well officials in 113 Chinese
cities are implementing China’s Open Information Law.221 The rankings,
which have been released over the last four years, are called the Pollution
Information and Transparency Index (PITI). Data from the fourth PITI
report, which covers 2012, showed improvement in the average
performance of officials in these cities, particularly in top performing
cities.222 However, the report also found that some cities regressed and
others still provided almost no environmental information.223 The principal
problem areas seem to be disclosure of environmental impact assessments,
information concerning environmental violations, and emissions data. The
report calls for public disclosure on online monitoring data from key
polluters, comprehensive disclosure of government supervisory and
enforcement data, and periodic publication of emissions data for pollutants
covered by environmental impact assessments.224
Ma Jun’s IPE also worked with more than 20 other NGOs to audit
companies in the Chinese supply chains of multinational electronics
companies. Reports prepared by this NGO coalition harshly criticized
companies like Apple for using suppliers that regularly violated Chinese
labor and environmental laws.225 As a result of these reports, Apple joined
the Fair Labor Association and hired independent auditors to perform
regular audits of its supply chain.226 These audits already are having an
impact as Apple has taken actions to discipline suppliers who fail to
comply with these laws, as documented in the company’s annual Apple
Supplier Responsibility report that discloses the results of these audits.227
As environmental conditions have continued to deteriorate in China,
the public is becoming increasingly militant in demanding greater
transparency. Barbara Finamore, NRDC’s Asia Director, expresses
optimism that China may move toward regular publication of emissions
221. Ma Jun (马军), 2011 PITI Results and Analysis Released (Jan. 17, 2012, 11:19 AM),
http://news.qq.com/a/20120117/000957.htm.
222. See INST. OF PUB. & ENVTL. AFF., http://www.ipe.org.cn.
223. See Ma Jun, supra note 221.
224. See INST. OF PUB. & ENVTL. AFF., supra note 222.
225. Ma Jun, supra note 221.
226. Don Resinger, Apple Planning Environmental Audits of Chinese Supply Chain, CNET (Feb.
21, 2012, 7:04 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13506_3-57381645-17/apple-planning-environmentalaudits-of-chinese-supply-chain.
227. APPLE, INC., APPLE SUPPLIER RESPONSIBILITY: 2013 PROGRESS REPORT (2013), available at
http://www.apple.com/supplierresponsibility/reports.html.
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data by adopting some form of Pollution Release and Transfer Register, as
more than 50 other countries have done.228
2. The Government’s Information Disclosure and NGOs
China’s former State Environmental Protection Administration
(SEPA) issued the “environmental impact assessment of public
participation in the Interim Measures” which came into force on March 18,
2006.229 Pursuant to Article 11 of these regulations construction units or
their authorized environmental impact assessment agency can take
measures to facilitate public understanding of the environmental impact
assessment report.230
China has adopted freedom of information regulations very similar to
those in effect in the United States. The State Council’s regulations on the
Disclosure of Government Information and Disclosure of Environmental
Information (Trial) both took effect on May 1, 2008.231 The Regulation of
Disclosure of Government Information is known as the third revolution of
Chinese government reform. Its significance is to provide a legal guarantee
for the public’s right to know.232 Compared to China’s corporate
information disclosure, environmental information disclosure by the
government represents a very significant step forward. Many
environmental NGOs and even research scholars and students now can
obtain information.
Of course due to the restriction of disseminating information to the
people in the history of Chinese culture, government information disclosure
in China has still a long way to go. After China’s implementation of the
information disclosure law through government information disclosure
regulations some environmental NGOs who sought information often were
frustrated. Less than half of local governments responded positively to such
information requests.233
228. See Finamore, supra note 206.
229. CHINA’S STATE ENVTL. PROT. ADMIN. (SEPA), INTERIM MEASURES ON PUBLIC
PARTICIPATION
IN
ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT
ASSESSMENT
(2006),
available
at
http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2006-02/22/content_207093_2.htm.
230. Id.
231. CHINA’S STATE ENVTL. PROT. ADMIN., DISCLOSURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION
(TRIAL),
ORDER
NO.
35,
available
at
http://www.zhb.gov.cn/info/gw/juling/200704/
t20070420_102967.htm; CHINA’S STATE COUNCIL, THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON OPEN
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION, available at http://www.gov.cn/xxgk/pub/govpublic/tiaoli.html.
232. CHINA’S STATE ENVTL. PROT. ADMIN., supra note 231.
233. Why is Environmental Information Disclosure so Difficult? SO. WEEKEND (June 24, 2010,
11:42 AM), http://www.infzm.com/content/46698.
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Some environmental information is still closely guarded by the
Chinese government. It is widely believed that China has serious problems
of soil contamination. In 2006, the State Environmental Protection Agency
(now MEP) and the Ministry of Land launched an extensive survey of soil
contamination problems in China. The study took four years, but when it
was completed the data it collected were not released to the public. Beijing
lawyer, Dong Zhengwei submitted a request for government disclosure of
the results of the study.234 However, China’s MEP refused to disclose it,
citing the need to protect “national secrets.”235
CONCLUSIONS
Concern about environmental problems has spawned the growth of
environmental NGOs in both the U.S. and China. Environmental NGOs in
China can be divided into three categories – official NGOs, international
NGOs, and grassroots NGOs. Because of heavy state control of NGOs,
each of these groups operates in a much more confined legal and political
environment than their counterparts in the United States. However,
environmental NGOs in China seem to have greater freedom than NGOs
that focus on other issues. While international NGOs generally have greater
resources than the other environmental NGOs, it is not easy for them to get
the registration permit from the Chinese government, and their range of
activities is limited. Grassroots NGOs generally lack sufficient financial
and professional support, thereby restricting the role that they can play.
Official NGOs in China are in the best position to operate because of their
relatively richer social resources, and their comparatively wider network of
contacts in the government.
China is now moving to make it easier for NGOs to operate. In the
long run, the development of grassroots NGOs may prove to be the best
indicator of social progress. Experience in the U.S. has demonstrated that
environmental NGOs can help improve environmental policy as EPA and
other federal agencies have become much more responsive to citizens’
concerns due to interactions with NGOs. Yet comparison of the role of civil
society in environmental policy in the U.S. and China demonstrates the
naiveté of simple assumptions that the U.S. legal system should be
234. China Focus: Soil pollution data remains secret, stirs public concern, China Society For
Human Rights Studies (May 9, 2013), http://qr.showchina.org/Harmonioussociety/Environment/
t20130510_1036598.htm.
235. Zhang Chun, Why Should Soil Pollution Data be Kept a “State Secret”?. CHINA DIALOGUE
(Mar. 4, 2013), https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/5758-Why-should-soil-pollutiondata-be-kept-a-state-secret.

Percival -Final (Do Not Delete)

Fall 2013]

7/21/2014 4:28 PM

ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE IN THE U.S. AND CHINA

181

transplanted to China.
China clearly has more serious problems than the U.S. with
enforcement of its environmental laws. China’s experience reflects in part
the greater decentralization of its system of environmental law with local
environmental protection boards having considerable power. To be sure
“the idea that local officials subvert the central leadership’s good
intentions” on environmental issues has become a “familiar narrative in
Chinese politics” but one that is important to approach with a good degree
of nuance.236 A survey of Chinese NGOs reports that NGO leaders have a
more positive opinion of local leaders than the general public in China.237
Local efforts to protect economically important industries in China are real,
but it is too simplistic “to call the central government pro-environment and
the local government pro-growth.”238 In several provinces efforts are being
made to adopt innovative measures to protect the environment, including
the creation of environmental courts. In similar fashion, some U.S. states
have adopted innovative measures to control environmental problems that
go far beyond what the federal government has required. California, for
example, has been pursuing a statewide cap-and-trade program to control
greenhouse gas emissions within the state. But overall China’s experience
demonstrates the reality of the “race to the bottom” hypothesis that was a
major justification for the high degree of centralization embodied in the
U.S. environmental laws.
It is much easier to enact environmental legislation in China, because
of its one party system, than it is in the U.S. Environmentalists in China
need not worry about legislative gridlock, but this also may be a factor in
China’s greater difficulty with enforcement of its environmental laws. U.S.
environmental laws are the product of hard fought compromises between
environmentalists and the regulated community, which may lend greater
legitimacy to the laws leading industry to take them more seriously.
Experience with citizen suits in the U.S. indicates that they have
played a vital role in forcing agencies to issue regulations to implement the
environmental laws. However, they have not been as significant a factor in
enforcement of regulations except in cases where violations are easy for
citizens to prove. There is no current prospect that China will permit citizen
suits against central government agencies, but this type of litigation is less
necessary in China because industry lobbyists do not block the State
Council from issuing regulations. Chinese law is moving toward express
recognition of citizen suits against polluters, at least when brought by
236. STERN, supra note 134, at 232.
237. HILDEBRANDT, supra note 12, at 160–61.
238. Id.
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official NGOs. The U.S. experience suggests that such lawsuits can be
useful, but they are no panacea for chronic enforcement problems in light
of the difficulty of proving violations in many cases.
The emphasis some Chinese environmental NGOs are placing on
transparency and disclosure initiatives appears to be a creative strategy that
enables them to effect change without threatening the established legal
order. The development of environmental NGOs in China is a relatively
recent phenomenon, but barring an unexpected backlash from the central
government, it is likely that their growth will continue. It is likely that these
NGOs will continue to promote information disclosure and become more
involved in monitoring administrative actions through litigation, and even
playing a greater role in influencing the development of legislation and
regulations. Potentially this could have a significant effect on development
of the whole administrative legal system in China. Even at this stage, it is
undeniable that Chinese environmental NGOs have contributed greatly to
democratic consolidation in the environmental regime through public
interest litigation and disclosure of environmental information.
Despite substantial differences between the Chinese legal system and
that of the U.S., environmental concerns have become so urgent in China
and much of the world that they are inspiring efforts by NGOs to reverse
the laxity of administrative supervision. Chinese NGOs are trying every
means to expose existing environmental problems in China and to demand
better environmental protection policies. Environmental protection is a
common concern of mankind supported by universal values throughout the
world. China’s difficulties with environmental enforcement should provide
a cautionary lesson for those in the U.S. who advocate relaxing federal
regulation and devolving greater environmental authority to lower levels of
government. The road that U.S. environmental NGOs have traveled
provides valuable experience to inform China’s efforts to build a stronger
civil society.

